Happiness and time allocation by Baucells, Manel & Sarin, Rakesh K.
 
 



































IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Avda. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Tel.: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 
Copyright © 2007 IESE Business School. 
 
Working Paper 
WP no 710 
September, 2007 Happiness and Time Allocation
Manel Baucells∗ Rakesh K. Sarin†
July 24, 2007
Abstract
We consider a resource allocation problem in which time is the principal resource. Utility
is derived from time-consuming leisure activities, as well as from consumption. To acquire
consumption, time needs to be allocated to income generating activities (i.e., work). Leisure
(e.g., socialrelationships, familyand rest) isconsideredabasicgood, anditsutilityisevaluated
usingtheDiscountedUtilityModel. Consumptionisadaptiveanditsutilityisevaluatedusinga
reference-dependentmodel. Keyempiricalﬁndingsinthehappinessliteraturecanbeexplained
by our time allocation model. Further, we examine the impact of projection bias on time
allocation between work and leisure. Projection bias causes individuals to overrate the utility
derived from income; consequently, individuals may allocate more than the optimal time to
work. This misallocation may produce a scenario in which a higher wage rate results in a
lower total utility.´ a
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11 Introduction
“The constitution only gives you the right to pursue happiness. You have to catch it
yourself.”
– Benjamin Franklin
The Ancient Greeks believed that happiness was controlled by luck, fate or the gods and was
beyond human control (McMahon, 2006). Socrates and Aristotle regarded the human desire to be
happy as self-evident and focused instead on how to become happy. In recent years, the science of
happiness has emerged as a new area of research that attempts to determine what makes us happy.
This area of research has at its foundation the measurement of happiness or well-being by means of
self-reports. In line with Easterlin (2003) and Frey and Stutzer (2002), we use the terms happiness,
well-being and life satisfaction interchangeably and assume that these measures are a satisfactory
empirical approximation of individual utility.
In developed countries, particularly in the United States, economic progress is a key factor in
improvingindividuals’well-being. Tocqueville(1998)observed, “Thelureofwealthisthereforeto
betraced, aseitheraprincipleoranaccessorymotiveatthebottomofallthattheAmericansdo, this
gives to all their passions a sort of family likeness.” Survey results show, however, that happiness
scores have remained ﬂat in developed countries despite considerable increases in average income.
In Japan, for example, a ﬁve-fold increase in real per capita income has led to virtually no increase
in average life satisfaction (Figure 1). A similar pattern holds for the United States and Britain. In
spite of these survey results, we contend that most people believe that more money will buy them
more happiness.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The ﬁrst is to show that an adaptation and social compar-
ison model of time allocation is consistent with key empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between
money and happiness. The second is to show that under the plausible psychological assumption
of projection bias there could be a misallocation of time resulting in some paradoxical predictions.
2It is because of projection bias that individuals believe that more money will buy them a lot more
happiness than it actually does, and may even lead to a scenario in which a higher wage rate results
in a lower total utility.
We present our adaptation and social comparison model of time allocation in Section 2. An in-
dividual allocates a ﬁxed amount of time between work and leisure in each period. The total utility
is the discounted sum of utility derived from consumption and leisure. Leisure (e.g., time spent
with friends and family) provides direct utility and is not adaptive. In contrast, there is evidence
in the literature that, beyond a set level of income at which basic needs are met, consumption is
adaptive. The carrier of per period utility of consumption is therefore the relative consumption
with respect to a reference level. In general, the reference level of consumption depends on past
consumption and social comparison. A rational individual will allocate the same ﬁxed proportion
of time to work and leisure in each period (say 40% to work and 60% to leisure) and choose an
increasing consumption path over time.
In Section 3, we summarize some key empirical ﬁndings from the “happiness” literature. Our
model, undertheassumptionofoptimizingindividualutility, isconsistentwithsomeoftheﬁndings
in the literature. Our model can explain [1] why happiness scores in developed countries are ﬂat
in spite of considerable increases in average income, and [2] why there is a positive relationship
between individual income and happiness within a society at any given point in time. However,
this optimization model cannot explain, without some further assumptions, the puzzle: Why do we
believe that more money will buy us lot more happiness than it actually does?
In Section 4, we introduce projection bias into our model. Projection bias causes people to un-
derestimate the effects of adaptation, which in turn causes them to overestimate the utility derived
from adaptive goods. This is akin to buying more food at the grocery store when hungry or ruling
out the possibility of a large turkey dinner for Christmas after ﬁnishing a hearty meal at Thanks-
giving. Similarly, an individual who moves to a more prosperous neighborhood may insufﬁciently
3account for the increased desire for fancy cars and a higher standard of living that will occur once
he begins to compare himself to and identify with his new neighbors. A pernicious effect of pro-
jection bias may be that an individual continues to allocate more and more time to work at the
expense of leisure.
In Section 5, we examine the impact of wage rate on total utility. Under projection bias, an
individual may allocate a greater amount of time to work than what is optimal. The resulting
misallocation of time between work and leisure could actually lower total utility at higher wage
rates.
Social comparison has been found to be a determinant of behavior in both human and ani-
mal studies. In Section 6, we examine the implications of our model when reference levels are
inﬂuenced by social comparison.
Anunderlyingtenetofourhumanconditionisthattogainhappiness, youmusteitherearnmore
or desire less. Indeed, in our model, initial adaptation level and social comparison act to reduce
the available budget. Reference levels can be moderated through reframing or perspective seeking
activities. Such activities, however, require an investment of time. In Section 7, we extend the time
allocation model to include the possibility that reference levels can be inﬂuenced by investing time
in reframing activities such as meditation or other spiritual practices.
Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 8 and discuss some implications of our model to
improve individual and societal well-being.
2 Time Allocation Model
We consider a simple model of work-leisure decisions. In each period t, t = 1 to T, an individual
divides one unit of time between work, wt, and leisure, `t. Work produces income at a rate of µ
units of money per unit of time spent at work. For simplicity, this wage rate is constant over the T
































































Figure 1: Satisfaction with Life and Income Per Capita in Japan between 1958 and 1991. Source:
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002, Figure 2).
planning horizon (µ
PT
t=1 wt) and plans consumption, ct, t = 1 to T, so that total consumption
(
PT
t=1 ct) does not exceed total income. For simplicity, we assume that the individual borrows and
saves at an interest rate of zero percent. We also set the price of the consumption good to a constant
over time that is equal to one unit.
The individual derives utility both from consumption (i.e., necessities and conveniences of
life) and leisure (e.g., time spent with friends and family, active and passive sports, rest, etc.). We
assume that the per-period utility derived from consumption and leisure is separable and that the
total utility is simply the discounted sum of per period utilities.
We posit that leisure provides direct utility and is not reference dependent. One always enjoys
time spent with friends and family. Sapolsky, Alberts, and Altmann (1997) observed that amongst
the baboons of the Serengeti, those who had more friends suffered from less stress (measured
by levels of stress hormones including cortisol). Cicero said, “If you take friendship out of life,
you take the sun out of the world.” Similarly, family warmth, sleep, sex and exercise all improve
life satisfaction. Some aspects of leisure could indeed be adaptive, but Frank (1999) argues that
5conspicuous consumption is much more adaptive than leisure. Leisure is often consumed more
privately and is valued for itself and not often sought for the purpose of achieving prestige or status.
Solnick and Hemenway (1998) found that vacation days are not reference dependent. Similarly,
consumption of basic goods (food and shelter) is not adaptive. Since a large part of consumption
in afﬂuent societies is adaptive, we assume for simplicity that consumption is reference dependent,
but that leisure is not. Our results should hold with the weaker assumption that consumption is
more reference dependent than leisure.
There is considerable evidence that the utility derived from consumption depends primarily on
two factors: [1] adaptation or habituation to previous consumption levels, and [2] social compar-
ison to a reference or peer group (Layard, 2005; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Frank, 1985,
1997, 1999; Easterlin, 1995; Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bullman, 1978; Clark, 1996).
A woman who drives a rusty old compact car as a student may ﬁnd temporary joy upon ac-
quiring a new sedan when she lands her ﬁrst job, but she soon adapts to driving the new car and
assimilates it as a part of her lifestyle. Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bullman (1978) ﬁnd that lot-
tery winners report only slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than the control group just a year
after their win (4.0 versus 3.8 on a 5 point scale). Clark (1996) ﬁnds evidence that job satisfaction
– a component of well-being – is strongly related to changes in pay, but not levels of pay. Kline
(2006) reports that when monkeys were offered raisins and not the customary apple, their neurons
ﬁred strongly in response to the welcome change. After a few repetitions, this euphoria stopped as
the animals had adapted to the better food. People also adapt to country clubs and dining in ﬁne
restaurants. A crucial implication of adaptation is that the utility derived from the same $3,000 per
month worth of consumption is quite different for someone who is used to consuming that amount
of goods and services than for someone who is used to consuming only $2,000 per month. Several
authors have proposed models that account for adaptation in the determination of the total utility
of a consumption stream (Pollak, 1970; Ryder and Heal, 1973; Wathieu, 1997, 2004).
6In addition to adaptation, the utility derived from consumption also depends on the consump-
tion of others in an individual’s peer group. Driving a new Toyota sedan when everyone else in
the peer group drives a new Lexus sedan seems quite different than if others in the peer group
drive economy cars. Frank (1985, 1997) provides evidence from the psychological and behavioral
economics literature that well-being or satisfaction depends heavily on social comparison. Solnick
and Hemenway (1998, Table 2) asked students in the School of Public Health at Harvard to choose
between living in one of two imaginary worlds in which prices are the same. In the ﬁrst world, you
get $50,000 a year, while other people get $25,000 a year (on average). In the second world, you
get $100,000 a year, while other people get $250,000 a year (on average). A majority of students
chose the ﬁrst world.
People are likely to compare themselves to those who are similar in income and status. A
university professor is unlikely to compare herself to a movie star or a homeless person. She
will most likely compare her lifestyle to those of other professors at her university and similarly
situated colleagues at other, comparable universities. Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) ﬁnd
that Olympic bronze medalists are happier than Olympic silver medalists, as the former compare
themselves to the athletes who got no medal at all, whereas the latter have regrets of missing the
gold.
Relative social position inﬂuences biochemical markers such as serotonin in vervet monkeys
(McGuire, Raleigh, and Brammer, 1982). When a dominant monkey is placed in an isolation cage,
a new monkey rises to the dominant position. The serotonin level increases in the newly dominant
monkey and decreases in the formerly dominant monkey. Elevated levels of serotonin are found
in the leaders of college fraternities and athletic teams. Higher concentrations of serotonin are
associated with better mood and enhanced feelings of well-being.
We now state our adaptation and social comparison model of time allocation. We assume
the discount factor to be one. The set of decision variables in our model are three vectors each
7with T components. The ﬁrst vector is leisure, l = (`1,`2,...,`T), measured in time units. The
second vector is work, w = (w1,w2,...,wT), also measured in time units. The third vector is
consumption, c = (c1,c2,...,cT), measured in dollars. All three vectors take non-negative values.







v(ct − rt), (1)
rt = σst + (1 − σ)at, t = 1,...,T, (2)
at = αct−1 + (1 − α)at−1, t = 2,...,T, (3)
where a1 and st, t = 1,...,T, are given.
In the above model, rt is the reference level in period t. The reference level is a convex com-
bination of social comparison level, st, and adaptation level, at. The adaptation level is the expo-
nentially weighted sum of past consumptions in which recent consumption levels are given greater
weight than more distant past consumption levels.
For the remainder of the paper, the initial adaptation level, a1, will be set to zero by default.
Both u and v are normalized to take a value of zero if evaluated at zero. The ﬁrst component, u, is
the contribution of leisure to happiness; the second component, v, is the contribution of consump-
tion to happiness. Both u and v are concave and twice differentiable. To capture the phenomenon
of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), we allow for v
to be non-differentiable at zero, with v0(0−) ≥ v0(0+).1 Loss aversion is an important feature of
adaptation models, as it imparts the behavioral property that the individual will be reluctant to
choose negative values for the argument of v; that is, to choose consumption below the adaptation
level (see Figure 2).
1It is appropriate to think of v as the value function of prospect theory. This function is usually taken to be concave
for gains, and convex for losses. As our focus is on the positive region of v, we assume for mathematical tractability
that v is concave throughout. Empirical evidence shows that v is close to linear in the negative domain (Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv, 2005), so that the assumption of concavity for gains and linearity for losses is not farfetched.
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Figure 2: Exemplary Per-Period Utility for Leisure and Consumption.
That leisure is considered a basic good implies that the per-period utility of leisure depends
solely on the leisure time experienced during that period. For basic goods, the Discounted Utility
Model is appropriate (Baucells and Sarin, 2007). In contrast to leisure, consumption is considered
an adaptive good. It contributes positively to happiness during a given period only if consump-
tion is above some reference point; consumption below the reference point yields unhappiness.
The dynamics of the adaptation level, at, are endogenously determined by the individual’s own
behavior. Speciﬁcally, the adaptation level is a convex combination of past consumption and past
adaptation level (Wathieu, 1997; Baucells and Sarin, 2006). The parameter α measures the speed
of adaptation. If α = 0, then the reference level does not change and consumption is a basic good
(for example, food and shelter in poor countries). If α = 1, then the reference level is always
equal to the previous period’s consumption (e.g., buying a car in the next period that is worse than
the current car would feel like a loss). For mathematical tractability and insight, we will often set
α = 1 in our examples.
Work does not contribute to utility, but does provide the budget to purchase consumption. An
individual can plan consumption based on their total lifetime income. As there is just one unit of
time available per period, time spent at work reduces the available time for leisure. Work yields µ
monetary units per unit of time. With this in mind, the individual faces the following obvious time
9and money constraints:








The goal is to choose (l,w,c) so as to maximize V (l,c). To explicitly solve for the optimal time and
consumption allocation problem, it is convenient to deﬁne effective consumption as zt = ct − rt.
We redeﬁne the problem as one of ﬁnding the optimal values of `t and zt in the usual form of a
discounted utility model. The next step is to express the budget constraint, equation (5), in terms
of zt. To do so, we use the deﬁnition of effective consumption and the dynamics of equations (2)
and (3) to write:
ct = zt + σst + (1 − σ)at,t = 1,...,T, and (6)
at = αct−1 + (1 − α)at−1 = αzt−1 + ασst−1 + (1 − ασ)at−1,t = 2,...,T + 1. (7)
10One can then recursively calculate the overall lifetime consumption. In the general case where











1 − (1 − σ)(1 − ασ)T−t
σ
,t = 0,...,T. (10)







(1 + (T − t)α)zt + Ta1. (11)






(zt + σst) + (1 − σ)Ta1. (12)
We assume the general case in which α,σ > 0. Replacing (9) in the left-hand side of (5), using
PT
t=1 wt = T −
PT
t=1 `t in the right-hand side of (5) and rearranging terms produces:




















2To see this, let C, Z, S and A denote the summation from t = 1 to T of ct,zt,st and at, respectively. Adding
expression (6) from 1 to T and expression (7) from 2 to T + 1 (deﬁning aT+1 in the obvious way) yields:
C = Z + σS + (1 − σ)A, and
A + aT+1 − a1 = αZ + ασS + (1 − ασ)A.





(Z + σS) +
1 − σ
ασ
(a1 − aT+1). (8)




(1 − ασ)T−t(zt + σst) + (1 − ασ)Ta1.
Replacing aT+1 in (8) produces (9) and (10).
11The ﬁrst order conditions are:
u
0(`t) = µλ, t = 1,...,T, and (15)
v
0(zt) = κtλ, t = 1,...,T. (16)
It is interesting to examine expression (14). The left-hand side contains the drivers of utility:
leisure time and effective consumption. The wage rate increases the price of leisure (in reality,
it makes consumption more affordable), but also increases the maximum budget, µT. Effective
consumption is multiplied by the coefﬁcient, κt, which is easy to see from (10) that it is decreasing
in t. If we interpret this coefﬁcient as a price, we observe that effective consumption is more
expensive to purchase at the beginning of the planning horizon than at the end. The reason for this,
of course, is that early consumption above the adaptation level increases future adaptation levels.
The right-hand side of (14) contains the constraints of the drivers of utility. The main constraint
is the total money that could be earned if all available time were to be spent working, µT. This
maximum budget is reduced by (a weighted sum of) the social comparison level and the initial
adaptation level. Subsequent adaptation levels are not included, as they follow endogenously from
the optimization program. In summary, social comparison and current adaptation reduce the
available budget.
We assume that the right-hand side of the modiﬁed budget constraint (14) is non-negative. It
follows from (15), that the optimal time allocated to leisure, `t, is the same in every period. Let
` denote this constant value. The remaining time is devoted to work, w = 1 − `, which is also
constant.
We now examine (16). Knowing that κt is decreasing and that v0 is strictly decreasing implies
that the optimal effective consumption, zt, is necessarily increasing over time. To ensure that
z1 ≥ 0, it is sufﬁcient to have v0(0−) ≥ κ1u0(0)/µ. That effective consumption is increasing
is intuitive. Recall that consumption above the adaptation level yields positive utility during the
current period, but lowers utility during the subsequent periods as it increases the adaptation levels.
12This negative effect fades the closer one gets to the ﬁnal period. Hence, optimal planning induces
increasing values of zt. Of course, increases in zt produce increases in ct, as is evident from
expression (9). This expression shows that an increase in zt directly translates to an increase in
ct and an additional increase in ct+1,...,cT. Hence, consumption increases more than effective
consumption.
In the optimal plan, a decision maker follows a regular schedule of w hours of work and `
hours of leisure. Both consumption and effective consumption are increasing, which means saving
in early periods, followed by borrowing later in life. If the consumption good is not adaptive,
α = 0, and there is no social comparison, σ = 0, then it follows from (6) that consumption and
effective consumption are constant, as ct = zt + a1.
It is possible to ﬁnd a closed form solution if both u and v take a power form with the same


























Assumingβ > 0, weverifythattimespentonleisuredecreaseswithsocialcomparisonlevel, initial
adaptation and wage. In contrast, effective consumption increases with wage. Actual consumption
can be derived from effective consumption using (6) and (7).
3 Income-Happiness Relationship
Total utility in our model is regarded as an empirical approximation of happiness. Aristotle be-
lieved that happiness must be judged over a lifetime and that its constituent parts included wealth,
relationships and bodily excellences (e.g., health and beauty). To Bentham (1789), happiness was
attained by maximizing the positive balance of pleasure over pain as measured by experienced
utility (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). He argued that human affairs should be arranged to
13attain the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.
In recent years, researchers have been able to measure happiness and have collected a great deal
of empirical data that relates income, as well as other social and biological factors, to happiness.
Happiness in these surveys is measured by asking people how satisﬁed they are with their lives.
A typical example is the General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2001), which asks:
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days - Would you say that you are very
happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” In the World Values Survey, Inglehart and colleagues
(2000) use a 10-point scale with 1 representing dissatisﬁed and 10 representing satisﬁed to measure
well-being. Pavot and Diener (1993) use ﬁve questions each rated on a scale from one to seven to
measure life-satisfaction.
Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin (2000) and Davidson et al. (2003) have found that when peo-
ple are cheerful and experience positive feelings (e.g., funny ﬁlm clips), there is more activity in
the front left section of their brains. The difference in activity between the left and right sides of
the prefrontal cortex seems to be a good measure of happiness. Self-reported measurements of
happiness correlate with this measure of brain activity, as well as with ratings of one’s happiness
made by friends and family members (Lepper, 1998). Diener and Tov (2005) report that subjective
measures of well-being correlate with other types of measurements of happiness such as biolog-
ical measurements, informant reports, reaction times, open-ended interviews, smiling behavior
and online sampling. Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2006) discuss biases in
measuring well-being that are induced by using a focusing illusion in which the importance of a
speciﬁc factor (e.g., income, marriage, health) is exaggerated by drawing attention to it. Never-
theless, Kahneman and Krueger (2006) argue that self-reported measures of well-being may be
relevant to future decisions, as idiosyncratic effects are likely to average out in representative pop-
ulation samples. Frey and Stutzer (2002) conclude: “The existing research suggests that, for many
purposes, happiness or reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to
14individual utility.”
If people pursue the goal of maximization of happiness and have reported their happiness levels
truthfully in the variety of surveys discussed above, then how do we explain that happiness scores
have remained ﬂat in spite of signiﬁcant increases in real income over time (Figure 1)? Of course,
happiness depends on factors other than income such as the genetic makeup of a person, family
relationships, community and friends, health, work environment (unemployed, job security), exter-
nal environment (freedom, wars or turmoil in society, crime) and personal values (perspective on
life, religion, spirituality). Income, however, does inﬂuence an individual’s happiness up to a point
and has a moderating effect on the adverse effects of some life events (Smith, Langa, Kabeto, and
Ubel, 2005). As shown in Figure 3, mean happiness for a cross-section of Americans does increase
with income, though at a diminishing rate. In fact, richer people are substantially happier relative
to poorer people in any given society.
Figure 4















Figure 3: Mean Happiness and Real Household Income for a Cross-Section of Americans in 1994.
Source: diTella and MacCulloch (2006).
Our time allocation model is consistent with the joint empirical ﬁnding that happiness over
time does not increase appreciably in spite of large increases in real income, but happiness in a
15cross-section of data does depend on relative levels of income. That rich people are happier than
poor people at a given time and place is easy to justify even by the Discounted Utility Model.
Income effects are magniﬁed if the reference level depends on social comparison as, by and large,
richer people have a favorable evaluation of their own situation compared to others. Over time,
though, both rich and poor people have signiﬁcantly improved their living standards, but neither
group has become happier. Adaptation explains this paradoxical ﬁnding.
Consider Mr. Yoshi, a young professional living in Japan in the 1950’s. He was content to
live in his parents’ house, drive a used motorcycle for transportation, wash his clothes in a sink
and listen to the radio for entertainment. Also consider Ms. Yuki, a young professional living
in Japan in the 1990’s. She earns ﬁve times the income of Mr. Yoshi in real terms. She wants
her own house, own automobile, washing machine, refrigerator and television. She travels abroad
for vacation and enjoys expensive international restaurants. Because Mr. Yoshi and Ms. Yuki
are in similar social positions for their times, then both will have the same level of happiness.
Happiness does not depend on the absolute level of consumption, which is substantially higher for
Ms. Yuki. Instead, happiness depends on the level of consumption relative to the adaptation level.
Ms. Yuki has become adapted to a much higher level of consumption and therefore ﬁnds that she
is no happier than Mr. Yoshi. In our time allocation model, as the wage rate (µ) increases, total
utility stands still if the initial reference point (r1) also increases in the same manner calculated by
the model. Thus, the “Easterlin Paradox” – that happiness scores have remained ﬂat in developed
countries despite considerable increases in average income – can be explained by the total utility
maximization, provided the initial reference level, which measures expectations, increases with
prosperity. Happiness scores for poorer countries have in fact increased over time as the increased
income has provided for additional basic goods such as adequate food, shelter, clean water and
health care.
Many authors have given a qualitative argument that the reference point is higher for a person
16living in 1990’s Japan than in 1950’s Japan. Actually, we now show that as µ increases, total utility
stands still if a1 increases. In the following numerical example, we set α = 1 and σ = 0. An
individual with a1 = 0 and µ = 1, would obtain a total optimal utility of 11.4. This is obtained by
solving the leisure-consumption problem (1) assuming the power form for u and v with exponent
0.5. This same optimal total utility is obtained by setting µ = 5 and a1 = 3.4. Thus, a substantial
increase in wage does not lead to an increase in total utility if the initial reference level has also
increased.
So far, we have seen that our time allocation model is consistent with empirical ﬁndings that
within a country richer people are happier than poorer people, but, for prosperous countries, well-
being does not increase over time in spite of permanent increases in income for all. In a survey in
the United States, when asked to specify a single factor that would most improve their quality of
life, themostfrequentanswerwas“moremoney.” Thus, thepuzzleremains: whydopeoplebelieve
more money will buy them more happiness when in fact it may not. There is also some evidence
that people are working harder at the expense of leisure; sleep time has gone down from 9.1 hours
per night to 6.9 hours per night during the 20th century. The misallocation of time between work
and leisure is difﬁcult to prove, but we will show that under the plausible psychological assumption
of projection bias such a misallocation is indeed possible.
4 Predicted Versus Actual Happiness
“The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from
over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another.”
– Adam Smith (1759, Part III, Chapter III)
If people plan optimally, then they will maximize happiness by appropriately balancing time
devoted to work and to leisure and by choosing an increasing consumption path. Optimal planning,
however, requires that one correctly predict the impact of current consumption on future utility. An
17increase in consumption has two perilous effects on future utility. First, the adaptation level goes
up and therefore future experienced utility declines (e.g., people get used to a fancier car, a bigger
houseorvacationabroad). Second, thesocialcomparisonlevelmaygoup, whichagainreducesex-
perienced utility. When one joins a country club or moves to a more prosperous neighborhood, the
peer group with which social comparisons are made changes. The individual now compares him-
self with more prosperous “Joneses” and comparisons to his previous peer group of less prosperous
“Smiths” fades. If the individual foresees all this, then he can appropriately plan consumption over
time and realize higher total utility in spite of a higher level of adaptation and an upward move-
ment in peer group. The rub is that people underestimate adaptation and changes in peer group.
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) have documented and analyzed underestimation of
adaptation and have called it projection bias.
Because of projection bias, an individual will realize less happiness than predicted. The gap
between predicted and actual levels of happiness (total utility) further increases if one plans myopi-
cally rather than optimally. An example of a myopic plan is to allocate a budget or income equally
in each period (constant consumption), as opposed to an increasing plan. A worse form of myopic
planning would be to maximize immediate happiness through splurging (large consumption early
on) which is what some lottery winners presumably end up doing.
We buy too much when hungry (Nisbett and Kanouse, 1968), forget to carry warm clothing
during hot days for cooler evenings, predict that living in California will make us happy (Schkade
and Kahneman, 1998) and generally project too much of our current state into the future and
underestimate adaptation (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999; Loewenstein, Read, and Baumeister,
2003; Gilbert, 2006). vanPraag and Frijters (1999) estimate a rise of between 35 to 60 cents in
what one considers required income for every dollar increase in actual income. Stutzer (2003) also
estimates an increase in adaptation level of at least 40 cents for each dollar increase in income.
After the very ﬁrst year, the joy of a one dollar increase in income is reduced by 40%, but people
18are unlikely to foresee this reduced contribution to happiness. People do qualitatively understand
that some adaptation to the change in lifestyle that comes with higher income will take place; they
simply underestimate the magnitude of the changes.
In our model, the chosen consumption plan determines the actual reference level, rt, by means
of (2) and (3). In every period, an individual observes the current reference level, but may fail to
correctly predict the value of this state variable in future periods. According to projection bias, the
predicted reference level is somewhere between the current reference level and the actual reference
level. The relationship between the actual and predicted reference levels can be modeled using a
single parameter, π, as follows:
Predicted Reference Level = π (Current Reference Level) + (1 − π) (Actual Reference Level).
Thus, when π = 0, there is no projection bias and the predicted reference level coincides with
the actual reference level. If π = 1, then the individual adopts the current reference level as the
future reference level. An intermediate value of π = 0.5 implies that the individual’s predicted
reference level is halfway between the current and actual reference levels. This projection bias
model can be extended to any state variables that inﬂuence preferences, such as satiation level
(Baucells and Sarin, 2006). If consumption stays above the actual reference level over time, then
an individual with projection bias may be surprised that the actual, realized utility in a future
period is lower than what was predicted. The reason, of course, is that the actual reference level
is higher than anticipated. Actual happiness associated with higher levels of consumption may be
much lower than what was hoped for. This gap may motivate an individual to work even harder to
increase income in the hopes of improving happiness. But this chase for happiness through higher
and higher consumption is futile if the reference level keeps increasing.
To formalize these ideas, let τ be the current period. The actual and predicted reference levels
for a subsequent period t are rt and ˆ rτ,t, respectively. Now,
ˆ rτ,t = πrτ + (1 − π)rt,
19for which rt follows the dynamics governed by (2) and (3). The actual utility is given by the chosen
consumption plan according to the time allocation model; however, the chosen consumption plan
might not be the optimal one. The reason for this is that, during period τ, the individual will
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Figure 4: Impact of Projection Bias on Time Allocation [α = 1,π = 1,µ = 1].
The difference between the actual and the predicted utility can be demonstrated by a simple
example. Figure 4 compares the optimal plan to the plan implemented by an individual experienc-
ing the most extreme form of projection bias, namely, π = 1 and α = 1. In this example, wage is
set to one, and both u(x) and v(x) are set to
√
x.
The optimal consumption plan exhibits an accelerating, increasing pattern, as argued in Sec-
tion 2. This is indeed rational for an individual who is fully aware of two facts: [1] increments
and not absolute levels are the drivers of utility of consumption; and [2] high consumption at the
beginning of the time horizon heavily taxes utility in later periods, as it raises the adaptation level
in a permanent way. Hence, it is no surprise that consumption is low in the beginning and high
towards the end of the planning horizon. As expected, the optimal time for work and leisure is
constant over time.
20A rational individual would allocate approximately 80% of his time to leisure and 20% to
work. Now, consider the projection bias plan; the consumption plan under projection bias begins
in period 1 with a plan to consume 0.5 units. The amount of time devoted to work and leisure is the
same, i.e., 50% to work and 50% to leisure. This is not a coincidence. If π = 1, then the individual
predicts that the reference point for consumption will remain constant; therefore, this individual
treats both leisure and consumption as basic goods. As u and v are identical, an equal allocation of
time to work and leisure is optimal. Moreover, the individual plans to maintain the constant level
of consumption of ﬁve units per period.
In period 2, the individual realizes that the reference level, r2, is higher than r1; in fact, r2 =
c1 = 0.5. This is a cause of concern, as the original plan of ﬂat consumption of 0.5 units will
yield zero utility, v(0.5 − 0.5) = 0 for the consumption component. Here, projection bias enters
again. The individual again predicts that the future reference level will be the same as the current
reference level of 0.5 units. The individual, therefore, hopes that by increasing consumption above
0.5 units he can obtain higher utility. But to do so, he needs to expand the budget, which is not a
problem because he can work for 0.75 units, instead of 0.5. The additional units of time are taken
from leisure time, which now decreases to 0.25 units. In period 3, the same process repeats itself.
The gap between the actual and the predicted reference level may motivate the person to work
even harder to increase income in the hopes of improving happiness. But this chase for happiness
through higher and higher consumption is futile as the reference level keeps on increasing. Actual
happiness associated with higher levels of consumption may be much lower than what was hoped
for.
The degree of misallocation of time between work and leisure depends on both the adaptation
factor, α, and the projection bias parameter, π. In our example, percentage time allocations to work
for various combinations of α and π are shown in Table 1. For the optimal plan, as the adaptation
rate increases, the percentage of time allocated to work decreases. Similarly, for a given α, as
21projection bias increases, the individual works harder. In all cases, the actual total utility under
projection bias will be lower than that given by the optimal plan because of the misallocation of
time and the excessive consumption in early periods.
Optimal Projection Bias
Adaptation Factor π = 0 π = 0.1 π = 0.5 π = 1.0
α = 0.1 42 43 50 60
α = 0.5 28 32 54 81
α = 1.0 23 28 64 90
Table 1: Percent of Time Allocated to Work [µ = 1].
.
5 Higher Pay - Less Satisfaction
So far we have demonstrated that projection bias could induce people to work harder and therefore
beleftwithlessleisuretimecomparedtotherationalplan. Wenowexaminetheeffectsofincreases
in wage rate on total utility. A rational individual will always experience a higher total utility with
a higher wage rate by judiciously allocating time between work and leisure. Individuals, however,
do not always make sensible tradeoffs between work and leisure. Average sleep hours in the United
States fell from 9 hours per night in 1910 to 7.5 hours per night in 1975 with a further decline to 6.9
hours per night between 1975 and 2002. A USA Today report on May 4, 2007 titled “U.S. Workers
Feel Burn of Long Hours, Less Leisure” reports that U.S. workers put in an average of 1,815 hours
in 2002 compared to European workers who ranged from 1,300 to 1,800 hours (see also Layard,
2005, p. 50). Schor (1992) argues that Americans are overworked. In some professions in which
the relationship between income and hours worked is transparent (e.g., billable hours for lawyers
and consultant), there is a tendency to allocate relatively more time to work due to peer pressure.
A theory in anthropology holds that the rise of civilization is the consequence of the increased
availability of leisure time (Gross, 1984); and, Sahlins (1968, pp. 85-89) argues that the quantity
of leisure time proxies for well-being. Putnam (2000) observed in his book, Bowling Alone, that
22people who engage in leisurely activities with others were, on average, happier than those who
spent their leisure time alone. Aguiar and Hurst (2006), who document an increase in leisure time
for less educated people, observe that there has been a substantial increase in time spent watching
television (passive leisure) and a signiﬁcant decline in socializing (active leisure) for people of all
education levels from 1965 to 2003.
It is possible that experienced utility in a given period ut + vt may be lower if one dispropor-
tionately allocates more time to work at the expense of leisure. Budding entrepreneurs, investment
bankers and executives of technology companies may complain about their “all work and no play”
lifestyle, but many of them do retire early or change careers and it is hard to argue that their exces-
sive work in the early part of their careers was not rational. All work and no play may make Jack
a dull boy, but if that is what Jack desires then there can be no disputing his taste. We show that
in the presence of projection bias an individual may reduce his actual total utility by choosing a
higher wage option. A simple, two-period example will sufﬁce to illustrate this paradoxical result.
Consider a two-period example with α = 1 and π = 1. In period 1, an individual maximizes
predicted utility over the two periods by planning to work w1,1 in period 1 and w1,2 in period 2.
Because leisure is a basic good, the individual plans an equal amount of leisure in each period.
Consequently, the amount of work in each period is also equal, i.e., w1,1 = w1,2. Under extreme
projection bias, π = 1, the individual considers that consumption also behaves as a basic good.
Hence, the per-period consumption corresponds to the budget generated for that period, namely,
µw1,1. Finally, w1,1 is found by optimizing the predicted total utility given by:
V (`,w) = 2[u(1 − w1,1) + v(µw1,1)]. (20)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
u
0(1 − w1,1) = µv
0(µw1,1). (21)
The individual solves this problem and decides on his allocation of budget to leisure and consump-
23tion.3 During the second period, the adaptation level takes the value r2 = µw1,1.4 The individual
then realizes that the utility of consumption in period 2 will be zero if he stays with the original
plan. He therefore revises the plan by maximizing the utility in period 2:
V (w,`) = u(1 − w2,2) + v(µ(w2,2 − w1,1)) (22)
The optimal time spent working in period 2, w2,2, is the solution to the ﬁrst order condition:
u
0(1 − w2,2) = µv
0(µ(w2,2 − w1,1)). (23)
Inspecting (21) and (23), we observe that if v0(0+) > u0(1), then w1,1 is strictly positive and
w2,2 is strictly larger than w1,1. Therefore, the individual always revises the plan in favor of increas-
ing work and reducing leisure for the second period. The increase in work in the second period
is bounded, as w2,2 − w1,1 ≤ w1,1, with strict inequality if u is strictly concave.5 Thus, the utility
from consumption obtained in period 2, in spite of revising the plan, is less than or equal to the
predicted utility v(µw1,1).
The actual total utility is given by:
u(1 − w1,1) + v(µw1,1) + u(1 − w2,2) + v(µ(w2,2 − w1,1)). (24)
It is clear that the actual total utility (24) is lower than the predicted total utility (20). In period
1, actual and predicted utility coincide. However, in period 2, the actual utility of leisure is lower
than the predicted utility of leisure (w2,2 > w1,1). Similarly, in period 2, the actual utility of
consumption is lower than the predicted utility of consumption (w2,2−w1,1 < w1,1). We now show
3Applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst order condition (21), it follows that w1,1 increases with µ if
and only if the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion of v is less than one. This same condition also applies to
w2,2, the time that the individual decides to work in period 2 after re-optimizing the predicted utility.
4The conclusions and insights are the same if we use the full model and let r2 = σs2 + (1 − σ)αµw1,1.
5If w2,2 > w1,1, then using (21) and (23) yields µv0(µw1,1) = u0(1 − w2,2) ≥ u0(w1,1) = µv0(µ(w2,2 − w1,1)).
As v0 is non-increasing, it follows that w2,2 − w1,1 ≤ w1,1.
24that the misallocation of time between work and leisure could lower actual total utility when the
wage rate increases.
In the particular case that u is linear and v(x) = xβ, x ≥ 0, the actual utility is increasing in µ
if β < 2/3 and is decreasing in µ if β > 2/3. That actual utility may be decreasing with wage rate
is puzzling. To see this, notice that planned work is given by:
w1,1 = µ
β/(1−β)β
1/(1−β) and w2,2 = 2w1,1,
which, when plugged into the equation for actual utility, yields:
2 + (2 − 3β)(µβ)
β/(1−β). (25)
The puzzling result that total utility can be decreasing with wage rate holds more generally.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between total utility and wage rate for a ten-period case (T =
10) in which both u and v are strictly concave (taking power forms with exponents 0.8 and 0.5,
respectively). Optimal total utility is, of course, always increasing with wage rate, but projection
bias may decrease the actual total utility as shown in the upper left panel of Figure 5.
One must therefore be deliberate in choosing a high wage career (e.g., consulting or investment
banking) and be mindful of Veblen (1899)’s observation: “But as fast as a person makes new
acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard
forthwith ceases to afford appreciably greater satisfaction than the earlier standard did.”
6 Social Comparison
Adam Smith (1759) stated “With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches
consists in the parade of riches.” Veblen (1899) echoes a similar sentiment: “The tendency in
any case is constantly to make the present pecuniary standard the point of departure for a fresh
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Figure 5: Impact of Wage Rate on Total Utility Under Projection Bias [T = 10, u(`) = `0.8,
v(z) = z0.5, σ = 0].
classiﬁcation of one’s self as compared with one’s neighbors.” Meaning because most rich people
pursue comparative ends, they will ultimately fail to become happier.
An immediate question arises whether one can improve one’s happiness simply by imagining
less fortunate people. However, Kahneman and Miller (1986) assert that to inﬂuence our hedonic
state, counterfactuals must be plausible, not just possible, alternatives to reality. The all too com-
mon tactic of a parent coaxing a child to appreciate food by reminding them of starving children in
third world countries does not work. There seems to be a tendency to want conspicuous success.
In many professions, income has become that measure of success; therefore, people pursue higher
income not just for consumption, but as a scorecard of their progress. Conspicuous success also
26seems to have no end. Russell (1930) wrote, “If you desire glory, you may envy Napoleon. But
Napoleon envied Caesar, Caesar envied Alexander, and Alexander, I dare say, envied Hercules,
who never existed.”
Social comparison levels in our model are exogenous; though a theory in which the appropriate
peer group and social comparison level is endogenous would be useful. Nevertheless, we can
provide some insight into the inﬂuence of social comparison on happiness. Consider, for example,
three groups of people: those in the highest quintile, the lowest quintile and those at the median
level of income ($83,500, $17,970 and $42,228, respectively, for the United States in 2001). By
and large, richer people have a favorable evaluation of their own situation compared to others.
In contrast, the economically disadvantaged will have an unfavorable evaluation of their relative
position in society. Assume the social comparison level, S, is equal to the median income. For
simplicity, we assume constant consumption around the annual income for each group. If we
focus only on the utility of consumption, then without social comparison (σ = 0) each of the three
groups will converge to the neutral level of happiness as each becomes adapted to their own past
consumption levels. By including social comparison, the happiness levels are pulled towards, but
do not converge on, the neutral level. The long run experienced utility is given by v(σ(x − m)),
which is the median income. This heuristic argument is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that
richer people are happier than poorer people.
Now consider two individuals: Average Joe and Fantastic Sam. Average Joe is a highly paid
stockbroker (µ = 10), but his peer group also has high incomes (S = 8). Assume that u(x) =
v(x) =
√
x, α = 1, σ = 0.5 and a1 = 0. In an optimal plan, Average Joe would devote 96% of
his available time to work and 4% to leisure. His total consumption would be 96 units and his total
utility would be 13.8. In contrast, Fantastic Sam is an above average journalist who earns half as
much as Joe (µ = 5), but compares favorably with his peer group (S = 1). Planning optimally,
Sam would devote 80% of his time to work and 20% to leisure. His total consumption would be
2740 units and his total utility would be 17.89. Sam would be happier than Joe in spite of his lower
income and lower consumption because his position relative to his peers is superior to that of Joe’s.
Projection bias could induce Sam to chase the prosperous life of a stockbroker if offered the
opportunity. In this case, projection bias would affect him through his underestimation of the
upcoming change in social comparison level. Sam could indeed be happier as a stockbroker, but
he should put some thought into forecasting his relative position amongst stockbrokers and how
that would impact his future utility. If he concludes that he would be an average stockbroker, then
journalism might indeed be the right pond for Fantastic Sam (Frank, 1985).
7 Reframing
“One does not become happy overnight, but with patient labor day after day. Happi-
ness is constructed, and that requires effort and time. In order to become happy, we
have to learn how to change ourselves.”
– Luca and Francesco Cavalli-Sforza (1998)
In our model, the dynamics of adaptation and social comparison are not part of an individual’s
choices. This implies that an individual does not have control over adaptation to consumption or
over one’s own expectations determined by his peer group. It is possible to have heterogeneous
individuals with different speeds of adaptation and weights given to social comparison. However,
for a given individual, both α and σ are ﬁxed and there is nothing this individual can do to change
his speed of adaptation or intensity of social comparison. The same can be said about π, the
inability to accurately predict future reference levels.
While adaptation and social comparison are unavoidable to a certain extent, we believe that
individuals do have some tools available to moderate these factors. It is possible that through
reframing activities such as spiritual practices, meditation or prayer, one might gain a better per-
spective on life and reduce the harmful effects of comparison. Such practices, however, require
considerable time, effort and discipline. An admiring fan congratulated a violinist for playing so
28beautifully and said “I would love to play like you.” The violinist answered: “Yes, but would you
love it even if you had to practice 10,000 hours?”
We now attempt to introduce the impact of reframing and perspective seeking into our model.
We assume a new decision variable is available to the individual, namely the time that he sets
aside in each period for “reframing activities.” To keep things simple, we assume that this time is
constant throughout the planning horizon, which we denote by q.
The choice of q is made in period 1 and after this choice is made the time available for work and
leisure is reduced to 1 − q in all periods. In other words, an individuals commits in period 1 to set
aside a ﬁxed amount of time to such practices. Reframing activities contribute to gaining perspec-
tive on life, appreciating all received goods as if had been received for the ﬁrst time, encountering
ways to suppress or avoid (unfavorable) social comparison and ﬁnding inner happiness. Lama and
Cutler (1998) explain “The actual secrets of the path to happiness are determination, effort, and
time.” Neuroscience conﬁrms that repetition is essential for the brain to be retrained. Cellists have
more developed brain areas for the ﬁngers of their left-hand, mechanics for their sense of touch
and monks for the activity in the left prefrontal cortex, which is associated with cheerfulness.
Devoting time to reframing activities has an opportunity cost (less time available for work
or leisure). We assume that the beneﬁt of reframing activities is in lowering the reference level.
Speciﬁcally, we modify the time allocation model by replacing the updating equation (2) with:
rt = e
−ρq[σst + (1 − σ)at], t = 1,...,T,
where ρ measures the effectiveness of reframing activities (e.g., competent teacher, seriousness of
commitment, etc.) and q is the time devoted to such activities. The modiﬁcation simply multiplies
the previous reference level by a reduction factor, e−ρq. This reduction factor is 1 if the time spent
in reframing activities is 0; however, if q > 0, then the factor is strictly less than 1. The value of q
is now part of the set of decision variables.
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it is not worth spending any time in reframing activities. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that
the optimal time spent in reframing activities is non-monotonic with ρ. This is to be expected. If ρ
is sufﬁciently high, then a little time devoted to reframing can do a lot to reduce reference levels.
Of course, total utility is monotonic with ρ, as the per-period utility of consumption increases as
reference levels decrease.
8 Conclusions
“No society can surely be ﬂourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable.”
– Adam Smith (1776)
A rational individual chooses an appropriate tradeoff between work and leisure thereby max-
imizing happiness. In this paper, we have proposed a simple adaptation and social comparison
model of time allocation, which predicts that happiness increases with income at a diminishing
rate. Furthermore, the optimal consumption path is increasing over time, as is relative consump-
30tion over the reference level.
Our model is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings that richer people are happier than poorer
people, but that happiness scores have remained ﬂat over time in spite of astonishing increases
in real income. Perhaps, the most interesting implications of our model are obtained under the
assumption that people underestimate the rise in their reference level (due to projection bias) and
thus overestimate the utility of consumption. Projection bias may lead an individual to devote too
much time to work at the expense of leisure. Their predicted utility under projection bias is higher
than the actual realized utility. This is why we believe that more money will buy us more happiness
when in fact it may not. Because of their misallocation of time between work and leisure, the actual
realized utility may even decline at higher wage rates.
In a preliminary attempt, we show that reframing activities, such as meditation or other spiritual
practices, may improvehappiness, butthat theseactivitiesrequire acommitment oftime. Davidson
and Harrington (2001) ﬁnd that the happiness level of Buddhist monks is higher than the average
population in spite of their frugal lifestyle. Additional empirical and theoretical work is needed to
understand the inﬂuence of reframing activities on moderation of reference levels.
Projection bias diverts resources from leisure toward adaptive consumption. Great discipline is
therefore required to give adequate attention to the importance of leisure (e.g., time spent with fam-
ily and friends, sleep and exercise). We are reluctant to venture into policy prescriptions without a
thorough analysis. However, if there is no awareness of projection bias, then a judicious applica-
tion of policies like mandatory leave (two weeks in the United States versus six weeks in France),
restrictions on work hours within limits (recent reforms for medical residents), having higher sales
taxes for adaptive goods than for basic goods and family friendly practices such as ﬂexible hours
could improve happiness. Time is the ultimate ﬁnite resource; therefore, its allocation between
work and leisure to improve happiness needs further empirical and theoretical inquiry. Restoring
a harmonious balance between work and leisure is a precondition to “catching” the elusive goal of
31happiness.
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